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unanimously to admit each other, or unless there is "gross fraud" involved.
Although the shadowy area of definition under the Corporate Securities Act
has been explored by many cases, and although Corporations Code section 25100
purports to exempt limited partnership interests from the Act, there still remains
some doubt, in any given case, whether a permit is required for the sale of an
interest in a limited partnership.
Samuel Frizell*
* Member, Second Year class.
EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF "SECURITY":
SILVER HILLS COUNTRY CLUB v. SOBIESKI.
Section 25008 of the Corporations Code defines a security as follows:
"Security" includes all of the following:
(a) any stock, including treasury stock; any certificate of interest or participation;
-any certificate of interest in a profit sharing agreement; any certificate of
interest in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease; any transferable share, invest-
ment contract, or beneficial interest in title to property, profits, or earnings.
(b) any bond; any debenture; any collateral trust certificate; any note; any evi-
dence of indebtedness, whether interest bearing or not.
(c) any guarantee of a security.
(d) any certificate of deposit for a security. [Italics added.]
The purpose of the Corporate Securities Act is to protect the public against
the purchase of spurious and worthless securities and fraudulent investment
sqhemes.1 To effectuate this purpose, there has been a definite trend in the
California courts liberally to construe the term "security" and to include almost
any transaction which could conceivably be called an investment.2 The courts
will look through form to substance to determine whether a transaction comes
within section 25008.3 In spite of this liberal trend, historically the courts
have firmly recognized that the investor must put up money or its equivalent
for a share or stake in an enterprise or venture with the expectation oj profit
before his interest can be classified as a security. 4
'People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601 (1951) ; Domestic and Foreign Pet. Co.
v. Long, 4 Cal. 2d 547, 51 P.2d 73 (1935); People v. Craven, 219 Cal. 522, 27 P.2d 906
(1933) ; People v. Jacques, 137 Cal. App. 2d 823, 291 P.2d 124 (1955).
' See Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Securi-
ties Act, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 343 (1945); Note, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 410 (1940); Note, 10
So. CAL. L. REV. 483 (1937); Note, 25 So. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1952) ; annot., 87 A.L.R. 42
(1933) ; annot., 163 A.L.R. 1050 (1946).
'People v. Sidwell, 27 Cal. 2d 121, 162 P.2d 913 (1945) ; Domestic and Foreign Pet.
Co. v., Long, 4 Cal. 2d 547, 51 P.2d 73 (1935) ; People v. Rankin, 169 Cal. App. 2d 150,
337 P.2d 182 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 905 (1960) ; Oil Lease Serv. Inc. v. Stephenson,
162 Cal App. 2d 100, 327 P.2d 628 (1958).
'Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Securities
Act, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 343, 358 (1945); BALLANTINE AND STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORA-
TIONs LAW § 479, at 621 (1949) ; 11 CAL. OPs. ATT'y GEN. 81, 83 (1948).
NOTES
In 1961, the Supreme Court of California, in Silver Hills Country Club v.
Sobieski,5 made a bold departure from this well established rule and held that
an expectation of profit to the investor was not the only test in considering what
is a security.
Plaintiffs in this case had formed a partnership to organize a golf and country
club. They sought to finance the purchase price of the land to be bought by
selling "memberships" in the club. They planned to raise $215,000' by selling
a total of 200 charter memberships for $150 each, 300 memberships for $200
each, and 500 memberships for $250 each. They actually sold only 110 charter
memberships for $150 each.
7
Both the membership application and the by-laws of the Club provided that
no interest in the real or personal property of the Club was to be conferred
upon or granted to a member, his only right being the use of the club facilities.'
All of the income, profits, assets and management of the Club were clearly
stated to be the property of the plaintiffs and under their sole controlY A member
could not be expelled except for misbehavior or failure to pay monthly dues; 10
and membership could be transferred, but only to persons approved by the Club. 1'
The Commissioner of Corporations concluded that these memberships were
securities and that their sale without a permit was prohibited by section 25500
of the Corporations Code.1 2  Plaintiffs obtained a writ of mandate from the
Superior Court setting aside an order directing them to halt the sale of mem-
berships in the club, and the Commissioner appealed. The District Court of Appeal
affirmed the Superior Court decision, saying that the membership application
specifically excluded any proprietary interest in the club by its members.'
3
The instrument in question merely gave members the right to use the premises
for limited purposes and was, by its own terms, revocable. 14 Such a membership
right was said to be nothing more than the grant of a license, not creating any
estate in the club. 5 Such a license is not included within the Code definition
of a "security."' 6  The court then discussed why the interest could not be a
security even if a sufficient property interest had passed. Citing only a few of
the authorities available, the court stated that the first test in defining a security
has always been "investment with the expectation of profit."' 7  Since there was
55 Cal. 2d 811, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 361 P.2d 906 (1961).
55 Cal. 2d at 812-13, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187, 361 P.2d at 907.
'Ibid.
'Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 9 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1961). This fact does not
appear in the Supreme Court opinion.
' 55 Cal. 2d at 813, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187, 361 P.2d at 907.
10 Ibid.
"Ibid.
12 "No company shall sell any security of its own issue, except upon a sale for a delin-
quent assessment against the security made in accordance with the laws of this State, or
offer for sale, negotiate for the sale of, or take subscriptions for any such security, until it
has first applied for and secured from the commissioner a permit authorizing it so to do."
13 Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 9 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1961).
14 Id. at 696.
"Ibid.
"Cal. Corp. Code § 25008.
"9 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
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to be no distribution of profits or income to the members, it was unlikely that
"profit" was a motive in purchasing memberships. The use of the recreational
facilities was obviously the only motivation.' s
Upon appeal the California Supreme Court, in its landmark decision, reversed
the District Court of Appeal by holding that the Country Club membership was
a beneficial interest in title to property and that it was therefore a security
within the language of subdivision (a) of section 25008 of the Corporations
Code. It stated specifically that this section of the Code extended even to trans-
actions where capital was invested without expectation of profit.19
The Supreme Court first recognized the broad definition given to a security
by section 25008 and the liberal interpretation by courts seeking more effec-
tively to protect those who risk their capital in questionable ventures. 20 It
continued by saying that the irrevocable contractual right to use the club facilities
qualified as a "beneficial interest in title to property" within the literal language
of subsection (a) of section 25008.21
The crucial question, however, was whether the sale of these memberships
was within the regulatory purpose of the Corporate Securities Act. Recognizing
that there is little or no authority for including sales of a right to use existing
facilities under the term "security," the court emphasized an important distinction
in this case. Plaintiffs were soliciting risk capital with which to develop their
business for profit. This risk to the investor was not lessened because his interest
was labeled a membership.
22
While almost ignoring the profit motive criterion that had been followed
for over 30 years, the court stated that the act is not limited only to those who
expect a profit from their investment. 23  It found support in section 25102
of the Corporations Code which lists exemptions from the Corporate Securities
Law.24 The court then concluded :25
[S]ince the act does not make profit to the supplier of capital the test of what is
a security, it seems all the more clear that its objective is to afford those who risk
their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in legitimate ven-
tures whether or not they expect a return on their capital in one form or another.
15 Ibid.
1955 Cal. 2d at 815, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188, 361 P.2d at 908.
20 Id. at 814, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187, 361 P.2d at 907.
2 Id. at 814, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188, 361 P.2d at 908. The court cites Yuba River Power
Co. v. Nevada Irr. Dist., 207 Cal. 521, 279 Pac. 128 (1929), in support of this proposition.
This case is inapplicable under presently existing law and has in effect been overruled. See
Rank v. (Krug) United States, 142 F. Supp. 1, 180, 181 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
" 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188, 361 P.2d at 908.
23 Ibid.
""Except as otherwise expressly provided in this division, the Corporate Securities
Law does not apply to any of the following classes of securities: (a) Any security (except
notes, bonds, debentures, or other evidences of indebtedness, whether interest-bearing or
not) issued by a company organized under the laws of this State exclusively for educational,
benevolent, fraternal, charitable, or reformatory purposes and not for pecuniary profit, no
part of the earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."
(Emphasis added).
2" 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89, 361 P.2d at 908-09.
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Although there are no similar fact situations in other California cases,2-1
an Illinois case held that a similar membership interest was not a security under
their statute even though each member was to have a proportionate and equal
undivided interest in all of the property and assets of the club, be they real,
personal or mixed.2 7  The reason for so holding was that there was a lack of
expectation of income or profit as the motivation for purchase.28 Other cases
have reached similar conclusions.
2 9
Silver Hills has considerably expanded the concept of "securities" in Cali-
fornia. In de-emphasizing the "profit motive" test, the Supreme Court has
consequently emphasized that the nature of the investment interest, and the
liberal purpose of the Corporate Securities Act, can be used exclusively in
protecting investment ventures. The law does not permit a person to circumvent
by sham the provisions of the Corporate Securities Act.3 0 Artificial tests are
often inadequate to deal with new schemes that threaten the public.
The "membership" interest in Silver Hills was apparently created with the
intent that its sale would not have to be regulated by the Commissioner of
Corporations. It expressly denied any interest in either the profits or the
property of the club to its members. The Supreme Court realized the risk that
each applicant was facing when he invested in a Country Club that was just
being formed. By emphasizing this "degree of risk," and the irrevocable con-
tractual right that each membership created, the court was able to bring the
venture within the literal language and broad purpose of the Corporate Secu-
rities Act.
"Expectation of profit," however, is not dead as a factor in considering what
is a security. It will still be used where it can meet the problem in question.3'
But in addition, where profit is not the motive for investment, the courts can
look at the degree of risk to the investor. If the person is risking his capital
in some type of fraudulent or questionable investment scheme, the court can
apply the rule in Silver Hills to reach an equitable result.
The older cases which developed the "profit motive" test looked to other
portions of Section 25008 of the Corporations Code than the California Supreme
Court did in Silver Hills.32 There appears to be no authority for a contrary
" An almost identical problem has, however, been analyzed by the California Attorney
General and his conclusion agrees with the dissenting opinion in Silver Hills. 24 CAL. OPS.
ATT'Y GEN. 33, 35-36 (1954).
.7 Hacker v. Goldberg, 263 Ill. App. 73 (1931).
2' Ibid.
'" Lewis v. Creasy Corp., 198 Ky. 400, 248 S.W. 1046 (1923); Creasy Corp. v. Enz
Bros. Co., 177 Wis. 49, 187 N.W. 666 (1922).
People v. Yant, 26 Cal. App. 2d 725, 80 P.2d 506 (1938).
3' Craft v. Brooks, 204 A.C.A. -, 22 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1962).
'2People v. Davenport, 13 Cal. 2d 681, 91 P.2d 892 (1939) (sub. sec. (b) . . .; any
note; any evidence of indebtedness) ; People v. Rankin, 169 Cal. App. 2d 150, 337 P.2d
182 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 905 (1960) (sub. sec. (a) ... any certificate of inter-
est in a . . . mining title) ; Oil Lease Service Inc. v. Stephenson, 162 Cal. App. 2d 100, 327
P.2d 628 (1958) (sub. sec. (a), investment contract) ; People v. Jacques, 137 Cal. App. 2d
823, 291 P.2d 124 (1955) (sub. sec. (a), beneficial interest in title to . . . profits or earn-
ings) ; People v. 5'Iarr, 46 Cal. App. 2d 39, 115 P.2d 214 (1941) (sub. sec. (a), any certi-
ficate of interest or participation) ; People v. Oliver. 102 Cal. App. 29, 282 Pac. 813 (1929)
(sub. sec. (a) any stock).
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interpretation of what is a "beneficial interest in title to property" within the
definition of a security; so that the case can only be criticized on policy grounds.
Whether the Legislature intended to include, within the Corporate Securities Act,
contributions by persons who expected only the use of certain recreational
facilities as a return is a matter for debate.
Robert S. LuJt*
* Member, Second Year class.
